1919–1989 · Brooklyn New York City

Leon Festinger

When what we do and what we believe don't fit together, what happens inside us, and why do we so often end up changing the belief?

  • social psychology
  • perception

Life and work

  1. 1919Born in Brooklyn, New York, on 8 May
  2. 1942PhD at the University of Iowa, where he worked with Kurt Lewin
  3. 1945Joins Lewin's Research Center for Group Dynamics at MIT
  4. 1954Publishes 'A theory of social comparison processes'
  5. 1956When Prophecy Fails, with Henry Riecken and Stanley Schachter
  6. 1957A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
  7. 1968Moves from Stanford to the New School for Social Research, New York
  8. 1983The Human Legacy, his book on archaeology and human nature
  9. 1989Dies in New York City on 11 February

The big ideas

  • Pressures toward uniformity in groups

    Historical

    Groups push their members toward shared opinions, and people who hold out tend to be pressured, then pushed to the edges. Festinger developed this from a housing study at MIT and follow-up laboratory experiments.

  • Social comparison theory

    Supported

    When there is no objective yardstick, people judge their opinions and abilities by comparing themselves with other people, preferably people similar to them.

  • Cognitive dissonance

    Mixed evidence

    Holding two thoughts that clash, such as 'I believe X' and 'I just argued against X', produces discomfort that motivates us to reduce it, often by adjusting a belief.

  • Disconfirmation can strengthen belief

    Contested

    In When Prophecy Fails (1956), Festinger and colleagues argued that a group whose prophecy did not come true became more committed and recruited more actively afterwards.

In brief

Leon Festinger was born in Brooklyn in 1919, the son of Alex Festinger, an embroidery manufacturer, and Sara Solomon Festinger. He studied psychology at City College of New York, then went to the University of Iowa to work with Kurt Lewin, whose field theory, with its focus on motivation and dynamic processes, shaped his thinking for life. He finished his doctorate in 1942, spent the war years as a statistician on a programme for selecting and training aircraft pilots at the University of Rochester, and in 1945 joined Lewin’s new Research Center for Group Dynamics at MIT. After Lewin’s death the centre moved to the University of Michigan in 1948, and Festinger went with it; he then taught at Minnesota from 1951 and at Stanford from 1955.

Those were the years of his best-known work: a theory of how groups pressure their members, a theory of how we judge ourselves by looking at others, and, in 1957, the theory of cognitive dissonance. Then, at the height of his reputation, he left social psychology. From the early 1960s he studied vision and eye movements, and around 1979 he closed his laboratory, explaining later that the questions had become too narrow for him. He spent his last decade on archaeology and the history of technology. He died in New York in February 1989, having declined treatment for a cancer diagnosed the year before.

The big ideas

Groups pull toward agreement. At MIT, Festinger, Stanley Schachter and Kurt Back studied married students living in campus housing (reported in Social Pressures in Informal Groups, 1950). Residents who were socially close tended to share attitudes, and those with unusual views tended to be isolated. Because those results were only correlational, the group moved into the laboratory. In a 1950 paper on informal social communication, Festinger argued that groups exert pressure toward uniform opinions and that this is one way people decide whether their beliefs are correct.

Social comparison. His 1954 paper extended the idea to abilities as well as opinions. People want to know where they stand. When there is no objective test, they compare themselves with others, and they prefer others who are fairly similar to them, since comparing yourself with someone very different tells you little. For abilities, he proposed a push upward: we want to be a little better than those we compare ourselves with, which can feed competition.

Cognitive dissonance. In A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957) he proposed that two thoughts that do not fit together, such as “I believe this” and “I just said the opposite”, create an unpleasant tension that we are motivated to reduce, for example by adjusting the belief. The best-known test, run with James Carlsmith and published in 1959, found that students paid $1 to tell someone a dull task was fun later rated the task more favourably than students paid $20. Our page on the $1 vs $20 experiment tells that story in detail.

When prophecy fails. Even before the book on dissonance, Festinger, Henry Riecken and Stanley Schachter followed a small group whose leader predicted a world-destroying flood for 21 December 1954. In When Prophecy Fails (1956) they reported that after the date passed, members became more committed and tried harder to win converts, which they read as an attempt to reduce dissonance.

What holds up, and what doesn’t

Social comparison has held up well as a broad idea: comparison with others is now treated as a basic process, and it has been extended to emotions, health, relationships and groups. The details have been revised. The sociologist Karen Hegtvedt notes that later researchers found the 1954 paper ambiguous on what counts as “similar” and on why people compare. A 2018 meta-analysis by Gerber, Wheeler and Suls found that people generally choose to compare upward, as Festinger expected, but that the usual result of comparing is contrast: seeing someone better tends to make people rate themselves lower.

Cognitive dissonance is one of the most influential theories in social psychology, and also one of the most revised. In 1967 Daryl Bem argued that people often infer their attitudes from their own behaviour, as an outside observer would, so no inner tension is needed to explain the classic results. Elliot Aronson argued that dissonance is strongest when it threatens a person’s view of themselves. Joel Cooper, working with Fazio, proposed that it arises mainly when we feel responsible for unwanted consequences. Cooper, a leading proponent, cites physiological and brain-imaging evidence for an aversive state and applied uses such as eating-disorder prevention programmes. A large 2024 replication across 39 labs in 19 countries led by David Vaidis and Willem Sleegers, found that writing an essay against one’s own view shifted attitudes slightly, but feeling free to refuse made no difference, contrary to a central prediction. The core idea survives; its mechanism and conditions are open questions.

The prophecy study is now the most contested of his claims (see below). It was always a single field observation, not an experiment.

The later work on vision attracted attention and some controversy, according to his student Stanley Schachter, and The Human Legacy (1983) was openly speculative: Festinger read arrowheads and other finds for clues about early divisions of labour, religious practice and play. It is best read as a thoughtful essay rather than as established findings.

The myth

The popular version of When Prophecy Fails is that believers always double down when reality proves them wrong. The book itself made a narrower claim, under specific conditions, and the record has since weakened even that.

In 1962 the researchers Hardyck and Braden reported that they could not find the pattern in another group whose prophecy failed, and studies of other movements, including Jehovah’s Witnesses after expected dates passed, found that failure more often reduced recruiting. In November 2025 the independent scholar Thomas Kelly published an analysis of Festinger’s papers at the University of Michigan’s Bentley Historical Library. He argues that the researchers and their paid observers influenced the group, including through invented psychic messages, that the group had already been seeking publicity before the failed date, and that it did not recruit substantially more afterwards. He concludes that the misdescriptions were deliberate. This is one researcher’s reading of the archive, published recently, and it has yet to be weighed in detail by other scholars; the debate is still open.

Connections

Festinger learned his way of thinking from Kurt Lewin: motivation, dynamic processes, and the use of experiments to study social life. Stanley Schachter, whose doctoral dissertation he supervised at Michigan, worked with him on the MIT housing study and co-wrote When Prophecy Fails. Elliot Aronson, a Stanford graduate student in the 1950s, became one of the main researchers of dissonance and later called Festinger the most influential social psychologist ever. James Carlsmith was his co-author on the $1 vs $20 experiment.

His work on group pressure belongs to the same post-war wave as Solomon Asch’s conformity experiments, and Daryl Bem and Joel Cooper shaped how dissonance is understood today, one as critic, the other as reviser.

Why it matters today

Social comparison is the everyday background of much current research and commentary on social media, where people see a steady stream of others who seem to be doing better. Festinger’s framework, and the 2018 finding that comparing usually lowers self-evaluation, helps explain why. Links from that to specific harms of particular platforms go beyond what his theory tested.

Dissonance gives a useful, if partly unsettled, lens on how people defend decisions they have already made, from purchases to political positions. A practical reflection, beyond the evidence: when you notice yourself arguing hard for something you once doubted, it may be worth asking whether the evidence changed, or only your position.

Festinger’s career also carries a lesson about science itself. Two of his most famous demonstrations, a small laboratory study and a single field observation, have needed revisiting decades later. The ideas they launched were bigger than the evidence first offered for them, which is exactly why they are still being tested.

Influence map

Learned from

  • Kurt Lewin

Influenced

  • Stanley Schachter
  • Elliot Aronson
  • James M. Carlsmith

Experiments on this site

Related: Solomon Asch

Questions people ask

What is Leon Festinger best known for?

For the theory of cognitive dissonance (1957): the idea that holding two clashing thoughts is uncomfortable and that we try to ease the discomfort, often by changing a belief. He also proposed social comparison theory (1954), about how we judge ourselves by looking at others.

Is cognitive dissonance theory still accepted?

In a revised form, yes, but parts of it are under question. A 2024 replication in 39 labs found that arguing against your own view shifts attitudes slightly, but did not find the effect of feeling free to refuse, which the theory predicts. Researchers still debate the mechanism.

Did Festinger stay a social psychologist all his life?

No. From the early 1960s he studied vision and eye movements, closed his laboratory around 1979, and then turned to archaeology and the history of technology, writing The Human Legacy (1983).

Who were Festinger's students?

Stanley Schachter wrote his doctoral dissertation under him at Michigan (1949). Elliot Aronson, who became a leading dissonance researcher, was a graduate student at Stanford in Festinger's time there in the 1950s and later called him the most influential social psychologist who ever lived.

Sources

  1. Schachter, S. (1994). Leon Festinger, 1919–1989. Biographical Memoirs, Vol. 64. National Academy of Sciences, 99–110. www.nasonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/festinger-leon.pdf
  2. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Leon Festinger. Britannica online. www.britannica.com/biography/Leon-Festinger
  3. Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7(2), 117–140. doi:10.1177/001872675400700202
  4. Festinger, L., Riecken, H. W., & Schachter, S. (1956). When prophecy fails. University of Minnesota Press.
  5. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Row, Peterson.
  6. Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58(2), 203–210. doi:10.1037/h0041593
  7. Bem, D. J. (1967). Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. Psychological Review, 74(3), 183–200. web.mit.edu/curhan/www/docs/Articles/15341_Readings/Motivation/Bem_1967_Self_perception.pdf
  8. Cooper, J. (2019). Cognitive dissonance: Where we've been and where we're going. International Review of Social Psychology, 32(1), 7, 1–11. doi:10.5334/irsp.277
  9. Vaidis, D. C., Sleegers, W. W. A., van Leeuwen, F., DeMarree, K. G., Sætrevik, B., Ross, R. M., … Priolo, D. (2024). A multilab replication of the induced-compliance paradigm of cognitive dissonance. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 7(1). doi:10.1177/25152459231213375
  10. Gerber, J. P., Wheeler, L., & Suls, J. (2018). A social comparison theory meta-analysis 60+ years on. Psychological Bulletin, 144(2), 177–197. doi:10.1037/bul0000127
  11. Hegtvedt, K. A. Social comparison processes. In Encyclopedia of Sociology (via Encyclopedia.com). www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/social-comparison-processes
  12. Kelly, T. (2026). Debunking 'When Prophecy Fails.' Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 62, e70043, 1–15. doi:10.1002/jhbs.70043
  13. Lasnier, G. (2010, September 20). Eminent social psychologist Elliot Aronson publishes memoir. UC Santa Cruz News. news.ucsc.edu/2010/09/aronson-memoir/
  14. Nisbett, R. E. (2000). Stanley Schachter, 1922–1997. Biographical Memoirs, Vol. 78. National Academy of Sciences. www.nationalacademies.org/read/9977/chapter/14